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Kentucky cases up to the present date.29 The latest one, Miles v.
Prott,30 was decided at the 1954 term. Recission of the sale of
a motor court was denied in part because the court found no evi-
dence of any misrepresentation on the part of the vendor. How-
ever, the statement was made in the opinion that actionable
fraud must be proved to secure recission of a contract.31
It is submitted that the Kentucky rule, denying recission of a
contract when there has been an innocent misrepresentation, is
contrary to the fundamental principles of equity, which grant
relief where the law affords an inadequate remedy, and which
prevent the injustice of allowing plaintiff to retain what he had
received. Under the Kentucky rule, equitable relief is no sig-
nificance, since the party seeking recission must prove all the ele-
ments of fraud necessary in a legal action for damages. Thus,
equity affords a mere duplicate remedy, and unless recission is
allowed under less rigorous conditions, justice may not always be
attained. Kentucky law regarding misrepresentation follows the
majority view and affords an adequate remedy against fraud, but
the Kentucky doctrine of equitable relief should be overruled.
ROBERT A. PALm
OIL AND GAS-WASTE OF OIL AND GAS
AS BETWEEN ADJACENT LANDOWNERS
The preservation of our natural resources is one of the most
important conservation problems of modem times. The waste of
"' Miles v. Profitt, 266 S.W. 2d 333 (Ky. 1954) and Hargis v. Hargis, 252 Ky.
198, 66 S.W. 2d 59 (1933) (Attack on a judgment by consent of the parties, in a
divorce proceeding; fraud was alleged.) Coons v. Bank of Commerce, 233 Ky.
457, 26 S.W. 2d 15 (1930) (Action by a holder and endorsers of a note on an
absolute guaranty of payment; defense was that the holder fraudulently repre-
sented that the security was worth the debt); Electric Hammer Corporation v.
Deddens, 206 Ky. 232, 267 S.W. 207 (1924) (Action on a note due for the
purchase of stock; defense alleged false representations in the transaction); Towels
et al. v. Campbell, 204 Ky. 591, 264 S.W. 1107 (1924) (Action on a covenant of
general warranty of property bought by the pl. from the def.; alleged misrepre-
sentation of title); Bewley v. Moreman, 162 Ky. 32, 171 S.W. 996 (1915)
(Action for recission of the sale of land alleging misrepresentation on the part of
the vendor); Taylor v. Mullins, 151 Ky. 597, 152 S.W. 774 (1913) (Counterclaim
alleging fraud, which induced the making of a contract to haul logs); Chicago
Bldg. & Mfg. Co. v. Beaven, 149 Ky. 267, 148 S.W. 37 (1912) (Action to set
aside a contract for subscriptions to the stock of a corporation to be organized,
on the ground that misrepresentations were involved in the making of the contract).
266 S.W. 2d 333 (Ky. 1954).
Id. at 336.
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oil and gas presents one of today's most perplexing problems, be-
cause never before has there been a greater need for these two
natural resources. This discussion is concerned with only one
phase of the problem, that is, waste as between adjacent land-
owners.
1
First, it will be helpful to obtain a definition of "waste" as ap-
plied to the situation under discussion. Such a definition is found
in Tiffany's REAL PRoPERTY:
Waste has been defined as 'an unreasonable or improper
use, abuse, mismanagement, or omission of duty touching
real estate by one rightfully in possession, which results in
its substantial injury. 2
Consideration must be given to the nature of the landowner's
right to oil and gas beneath the surface so as to better under-
stand the specific problem of waste.3 From the early beginning
of commercial drilling for oil and gas, the courts have been per-
plexed by the problem of what rights a landowner has to these
substances found beneath the surface of the ground. From their
determination of this question come the decisions as to what
should be done about waste of these products.
Although oil and gas are classified as minerals they are unlike
solid minerals in that they are of a fugacious nature. Because of
this difference, courts have turned to the analogies of percolating
water4 and wild animals5 in an effort to establish oil and gas law
along the lines of other already established principles of law.
Thus, the AmE:icAN LAW OF PR PERTY discusses the analogy to
wild animals, where a "capture" is necessary, in these words:
'This note is primarily concerned with the problem of waste as between ad-
joining landowners. For a discussion of waste as it applies to tenants, co-tenants
and remainderman including their rights and duties, see SumsRns, Or. AND GAs
52-56 (1st ed. 1927). The term landowner as herein used includes all those who
in the production of oil and gas derive their rights from landowners (lessees,
drillers, producers, etc.).
- TFFANY, RE.L PROPERTY 629 (3rd ed. 1939).
'This topic has been discussed at great length. See Summers, Legal Interest
in Oil and Gas, 4 ILL. L.Q. 12, 167 (1921); Hobson, Ownership of Oil and Gas in
Place, 13 Ky. L.J. 152 (1924); Veasey, Law of Oil and Gas, 18 MicH. L. REV.
445, 652, 749 (1920); 19 MICH. L. REv. 161 (1920); 63 U. OF PA. L. REV. 471
(1915); 29 YALE L.J. 174 (1919).
'Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (1843).
'Westmoreland and Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 30 Pa. 235, 18 Atl.
724 (1889).
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... courts relying on the analogy afforded by the law of
wild animals, which gives the landowner the exclusive right
to reduce game to possession while on his land, came to the
.. conclusion: that each landowner, apart from statute, had
the right to drill anywhere on his land and to appropriate
all the oil and gas that flowed to his well even though he
drained the oil and gas away from his neighbor. This re-
sulted in the "Rule of Capture," which carried with it
enormous consequences in the future development of the
law of oil and gas.6
The analogies mentioned above gave rise to the three theories
of ownership which are significant in the field of oil and gas today.
First, the theory that the surface owner has title to the oil and
gas in place, a fee simple determinable (ownership theory) ;7
second, the theory that he has no ownership or title in the oil and
gas beneath the surface, but only the right to search for it, and, if
found, to reduce it to possession (non-ownership theory);8 and
third, that he has a common interest with others in the minerals
and holds correlative rights therein (correlative rights theory) .9
The ownership theory" has sometimes led to the view that
inasmuch as the landowner has title to the oil and gas beneath the
surface he can do anything with it he desires, therefore, waste of
such minerals cannot be enjoined." This view is expressed in the
case of Hague v. Wheeler, 2 the leading case in favor of not en-
joining waste in a state which follows that theory. The decision
is critized in Summers' OI. AND GAS. 13 It is submitted that, re-
02 AMEmiCAN LAW OF PROPIETY 511 (1952).
'Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil and Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W.
290 (1928).
'Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 255 Ky. 685, 75 S.W. 2d
204 (1934).
'Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900).
" THORNTON, Onm. A GAs 94 (5th ed. 1932). "So strongly is the notion of
absolute ownership of the gas and oil in the land by the owner of it, beneath which
it is found, embedded in our law, that without the aid of a statute the owner of
such land cannot be prevented from wasting it by the owner of the adjoining
premises."
U Gas Products Co. Rankin, 68 Montana Rep. 372, 207 P. 993 (1922).
Hague v. Wheeler, 157 Pa. 324, 27 Ad. 714 (1893).
U Hague v. Wheeler, 157 Pa. 324, 27 AUt. 714, 719 (1893). "... it is not
the public interest that is involved in this litigation. It is the interest of an ad-
joining owner who seeks to appropriate to himself so much of his neighbor's gas
as he cannot turn into money or use for some practical business purpose, and he
asks a court of equity to hold his neighbor's hands by an injunction until this ap-
propriation is accomplished. We cannot find any rule of law or any principle of
equity on which such an injunction can rest.
SumnrmRs, OiL AN GAs 105-106 (1st ed. 1927).
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gardless of whether or not the Pennsylvania court made a wise
decision in 1893 when the Hague case was decided, the decision
should certainly be questioned today, if for no other reason than
the great need for this product in our national economy.
In the second theory (non-ownership theory), the courts have,
on the other hand, found ample basis for enjoining the waste of
oil and gas. Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co.4 is one
of the foremost of such cases. There, the court stated that be-
cause of the fact that natural gas beneath the surface cannot be
owned in fee, a surface owner should not be allowed to de-
liberately waste it so as to injure his neighbor. A Louisiana case 15
based the enjoining of waste on the principle that although a land
owner is not bound to do anything to save his neighbor from loss,
he must abstain from doing anything that might cause such a
loss. A Kentucky case' 6 reached the same conclusion on the basis
that a joint owner in the common field should be able to enjoin
any unlawful attempts on the part of other owners to destroy the
gas fields by unnecessarily or fraudulently wasting the gas.
It would seem that these cases reach the right result regard-
less of whether they be based on a desire for conservation or
squarely on a theory of non-ownership in the sub-surface minerals.
The principle as to a common reservoir and a reasonable use of
the supplies therefrom for the common benefit of all, which nat-
urally follows from an acceptance of the non-ownership theory,
is a basic argument in favor of the injunction against waste in the
non-ownership states.
" Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., 117 Ky. 71, 77 S.W. 368, 369-
370 (1903): "Independently of the statute, the common law affords an ample
remedy for a wrong like this. While natural gas is not subject to absolute owner-
ship, the owner of the soil must, in dealing with it, use his own property with
due regard to the rights of his neighbor. He cannot be allowed eliberately to
waste the supply for the purpose of injuring his neighbor. While a bad motive
will not render that unlawful which is lawl.... a man is only allowed to make
a reasonable use of those natural supplies which are for the common benefit of
all. . . . Every owner may bore for gas on his own ground and may make a
reasonable use of it; but he may not wantonly injure or destroy the reservoir
common to him and his neighbor.' This case on appeal is 132 Ky. 435, 111 S.W.
374 (1908). After the plaintiff was granted his injunction he again brought suit,
this time seeking damages for the gas which defendant had wasted and the court
allowed the claim holding that a suit for injunctive relief alone would not bar a
later suit for damages.
15 Higgins Oil and Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206
(1919).'6 Calor Oil and Gas Co. v. Franzell, 128 Ky. 715, 109 S.W. 328 (1908).
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Although this argument may not be considered feasible in an
ownership state the same result can be reached in such a jurisdic-
tion based on the following theory. Granted that the surface
owner holds title to the subsurface minerals beneath his land
and can use any lawful method of extracting them even to the
extent of draining the minerals from beneath a neighbor's land,
he should not be allowed to deliberately waste the minerals thus
captured. This is because: (1) such waste will deprive adjacent
landowners of present assets which can never be regained once
they are wasted; (2) even though he is not bound to do anything
to save his neighbor from loss, he should not do an affirmative act
which would cause his neighbor loss;' 7 and (3) such waste de-
prives the nation of much needed and valuable resources. There-
fore, a surface owner should be enjoined from wasting such pro-
ducts regardless of any theory of ownership, to protect his neigh-
bor, himself and his nation.
The third approach to the problem, known as the correlative
rights theory, 8 has been stated by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana as follows:
But there is a coequal right in them all to take from a com-
mon source of supply, the two substances which in the
nature of things are united, though separate. It follows from
the essence of their right and from the situation of the
things, as to which it can be exerted, that the use by one of
his power to seek to convert a part of the common fund to
actual possession may result in an undue proportion being
attributed to one of the possessors of the right, to the detri-
ment of the others, or by waste by one or more, to the an-
nihilation of the rights of the remainder. Hence it is that
the legislative power, from the peculiar nature of the right
and the objects upon which it is to be exerted, can be
manifested for the purpose of protecting all the collective
owners, by securing a just distribution, to arise from the
enjoyment by them, of their privilege to reduce to posses-
sion, and to reach the like end by preventing waste. This
necessarily implied legislative authority is borne out by the
analogy suggested by things ferae naturae, which it is un-
questioned the legislature has the authority to forbid all
' Supra note 15.
' Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900). Andrews, The Correlative
Rights Doctrine in the Law of Oil and Gas, 13 So. CAL. L. REv. 185 (1940).
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from taking, in order to protect them from undue destruc-
tion, so that the right of the common owners, the public, to
reduce to possession may be ultimately efficaciously en-
joyed. 19
This theory as thus stated does not guarantee each owner an
equal share but does guarantee him a fair opportunity to extract
a reasonable share provided he acts and does not sit idly by.
In addition, the Supreme Court in the Ohio Oil Co. case
upheld an Indiana statute which provided for the conservation
of oil and gas, thereby establishing the power of the states to
regulate the production of oil and gas.20 Thus, either by way of
the correlative rights theory, or through a conservation statute,
states have taken it upon themselves to regulate the production
of oil and gas in a manner so as to benefit all those concerned.
21
Conclusion: After having viewed the various possibilities, the
conclusion must be reached that under either the ownership, non-
ownership or correlative rights theory, and in the absence of
statute, waste of oil and gas may be restrained in the great ma-
jority of American jurisdictions. There are few decisions support-
ing the minority rule and their illogical view cannot be sustained
in our present day law. As was said in Commonwealth v. Trent:
The right of the owner of property to do with it [the oil and
gas] as he pleases is subject to the limitations that he must
have due regard for the rights of others. To allow the store-
house of nature to be exhausted by the waste of the gas
would be to deprive the state and its citizens of many ad-
vantages incident to its use.
22
Thus, for the future of our nation and its great oil and gas re-
sources, the problem of waste, as it applies to adjacent land-
owners, can be solved through judicial enjoinment. And, of
course, the same result can be reached by statute.
GEoiRGE D. ScmiADaE
Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 209-210 (1900).
See also Commonwealth v. Trent, 117 Ky. 34, 77 S.W. 390 (1903).
Moosa and Saloom, The Oil and Gas Conservation Movement in Louisiana,
16 TurLANE L. _Ev. 199 (1942).
" Supra note 20 at 393.
